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RESETTING THE BASELINE OF OWNERSHIP: TAKINGS AND
INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS AFTER THE BAILOUTS
NESTOR M. DAVIDSON ∗
During the economic crisis that began in 2008, the federal
government nationalized several of the nation’s most significant
private companies as part of a broad effort to forestall a global
depression. Shareholders in those companies later filed suit,
alleging that the federal government in so doing—and in
subsequent actions while in control of the firms—took their
property without compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. To date, those claims have not succeeded. If these
cases continue on their current trajectory, with courts rejecting
arguments that the rescue of systematically important firms on
the brink of collapse requires compensation for shareholders,
that outcome will have a profound consequence. Any investor
contemplating investment in such companies must now, in the
calculus of the Takings Clause, understand the change in the
reasonableness of their investment-backed expectations, and,
potentially even more broadly, the “background principles” of
property law that define such ownership, may now reflect those
outcomes. In other words, the fact that federal bailouts in the
recent crisis impaired (or even wiped out) shareholder value, and
that those policy steps are surviving Fifth Amendment takings
challenges, means we are resetting the baseline of expectation for
shareholders. As a result, future regulators contemplating the
need for swift intervention in the inevitable crises to come should
worry far less about takings liability.
INTRODUCTION
At the height (or, perhaps, the nadir?) of the economic crisis that began
in 2008, the federal government nationalized several of the nation’s largest
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companies in a bid to stave off a serious economic meltdown. 1 The most
notable examples included Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the American
International Group (“AIG”), and General Motors (“GM”). 2 In each
instance, the federal government provided significant financial resources to
rescue companies that were both failing and vitally important to the
national—indeed, global—economy. With federal help, the companies all
survived, and appear now to be thriving. 3
Proving that no good (or at least necessary) deed goes unpunished,
investors in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG later filed suit, alleging,
among other claims, that actions by the federal government to rescue these
companies “took” their property—their ownership stake and other corporate
rights—in violation of the Takings Clause. 4 The heart of their claims is that
the federal assertion of control, and subsequent governmental actions while
managing these firms, impaired or destroyed the value of investor equity
and other corporate property. 5
Although the litigation is still ongoing, courts have largely rejected
these claims based on a variety of theories. 6 If the litigation continues on
its current trajectory, it will not settle the intensely contextual question of
whether nationalization of failing companies in times of economic crisis
“takes” the property of shareholders. But it will send a clear signal to
investors contemplating ownership of companies integral to the larger
economy that nationalization is a valid policy option even when it
significantly impairs the value of ownership stakes in those companies.
This very visible crucible can shape what, in regulatory takings parlance, is
known as owners’ “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and might

1. For a detailed discussion of the crisis and an overview of policy responses, see Nestor M.
Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1628–32
(2010). There are many popular accounts of the crisis and aftermath as well. See, e.g., TIMOTHY
F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS (2014); ROBERT J. SHILLER,
THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 32 (2008); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND
THEMSELVES (2009).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra text accompanying note 103.
4. See infra Part II.C. Although no investor takings claims followed the GM bailout, auto
dealers whose franchises were terminated in the GM structured bankruptcy (and a similar process
involving Chrysler) are currently litigating claims that the terminations constituted a taking. See
A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1147 (2014).
5. See infra Part II.C. The AIG suit involves assertions of liability directly to shareholders
as well as derivative takings claims on behalf of the company. This Essay focuses on direct
shareholder claims, although the larger set of claims is relevant.
6. See infra Part II.B.
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eventually even rise to the level of a “background principle” of property law
that inheres in this particular type of entity ownership. 7
If so, judicial rejection of challenges to nationalization in the face of
vigorous opposition could have significant—and under-appreciated—
consequences. As the saying goes, it is difficult to make predictions,
especially about the future, 8 but it is fairly certain that another economic
crisis of some sort is inevitable, given the regularity with which they have
occurred since the Founding. 9 Bailouts that involve federal control have
proven to be a valuable tool to steady particularly important sectors of the
economy in moments of panic and to calm global financial markets. 10 The
ongoing takings litigation may thus yield a new baseline of ownership in
companies at the center of such crises in much the same way that investors
have internalized the existence of bankruptcy. If so, then going forward,
officials facing future panics can have greater confidence to take the steps
necessary to stop financial wildfires without fear of liability. 11
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly lays the groundwork
for understanding why a possible judicial rejection of takings challenges to
nationalization in times of crisis may factor into the expectations of
investors or even the background principles of property in the kinds of
companies at issue. Part II then reviews several of the primary flashpoints
that emerged from the economic crisis of the last decade, explaining what
led to nationalization in each instance and how the resulting takings
litigation has developed. Finally, Part III squares the circle, explaining how
these cases may change the baseline of ownership and why that shift would
be normatively justifiable.

7. For the doctrinal frameworks in which the reasonableness of an owner’s expectations in
light of regulatory constraints and background principles of property law apply to takings
challenges, see infra Part I.
8. This sentiment has been ascribed to everyone from Yogi Berra to Mark Twain to Neils
Bohr. It’s Difficult to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/.
9. See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY
OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2000); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2011).
10. Indeed, this may be even more important in future crises, given the creation of new
standing resolution authority enacted in the wake of the crisis. See Thomas W. Merrill &
Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 187–89 (2014) (analyzing Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regime for the
orderly liquidation of systemically significant nonbank financial entities).
11. I have elsewhere argued that the doctrine of emergency that has traditionally shielded the
government from takings liability when responding to situations like wildfire and contagion might
provide a novel avenue to validate nationalization under certain circumstances. See generally
Nestor M. Davidson, Nationalization and Necessity: Takings and a Doctrine of Economic
Emergency, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 187, 187–89 (2014). This Essay, by
contrast, focuses on the question of whether nationalization involves regulatory takings in the first
instance.
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I. REGULATION AND INVESTOR EXPECTATION OVER TIME
To understand how current takings litigation arising from the rescue of
several of the country’s largest companies may shape future crises, it is
necessary to begin with a framework for how existing restraints and
limitations on ownership shape the Takings Clause doctrinal inquiry. 12 It is
intuitive that if the legal system places a legitimate restriction on the use of
property (or similar constraint) and someone buys property with that
restriction in place, it would be odd for the owner then to claim that the
regulation has taken his or her property. 13 For example, if a state concludes
that a reasonable height limitation is necessary to protect common interests
in sunlight, and people come to conform to that limitation over time, it
clearly becomes part of how ownership is defined. In this sense, then, the
boundaries of property law are iterative over time and the existing
regulatory landscape at the time that property changes hands matters in
defining those boundaries.
On a more technical level, there are two primary ways in which this
intuition is reflected in the doctrine. The first is under the general default
framework for evaluating regulatory takings claims that the Supreme Court
articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 14 The
case famously laid out three factors of particular relevance to the ad hoc
evaluation of whether a restriction on property constitutes a taking, one of
which is an owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations.” 15 When
someone purchases property, although the existence of a regulatory

12. It bears noting that the frameworks described in this Part apply in the context of
“regulatory” takings and not the direct exercise of eminent domain. As will be discussed below,
see infra Part II, nationalization in the last crisis did not involve any steps to appropriate
shareholder interests directly, but rather involved actions by the federal government and the
companies at issue that placed the federal government in control, creating collateral consequences
for shareholders.
13. This is not to try to sneak the difficult question of the legitimacy of any given restriction
into a discussion of simple intuitions. There is obvious circularity in the proposition that a
legitimate restriction in place when an owner takes title should inform whether that restriction can
rise to the level of regulatory taking (if it is legitimate, how can it be a taking?), but remember that
there are many grounds on which a restriction might be challenged other than that it “goes too
far,” in Justice Holmes’ terms. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. See id. at 124 (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries [for regulatory
takings], the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.” (citation omitted)). The
qualifying term “distinct” quickly shifted in the jurisprudence to “reasonable,” and that is how the
Court now often describes the Penn Central test. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct.
2419, 2427 (2015); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 342 (2002).
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restriction is not dispositive, it certainly shapes how an owner should
understand the value and nature of his or her investment. 16
A close, but institutionally more complex variant is the concept of
“background principles” of property law as a limitation on potential takings
liability. As the Supreme Court set out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 17 the idea is that certain limitations on property rights become so
ingrained in the basic nature of the ownership of a given resource that such
limitations, in the Court’s words, “inhere in the title itself.” 18 Under such a
theory, a governmental action that replicates those inherent limitations,
even to the point of destroying the value of property entirely, is not
amenable to a takings claim. This concept is easy to understand in the
context of harms that are at the traditional core of the sic utere principle that
owners cannot use their property to harm others. 19 Someone poisoning his
neighbor’s land with toxic runoff would not expect to be compensated when
told to stop. The idea gets more difficult to grasp, however, when the
relevant limitations involve novel conceptions of harm, such as threats to
ecosystems (or, in the present context, purely economic harms). 20
The Supreme Court has been almost entirely silent on the process by
which evolving legal norms can come to “inhere in the title” under Lucas.
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court hinted that legislative change over
time could become embodied as a background principle. 21 The Court,
however, had little to say about how and in what way that process of
legislative change becoming embodied in property law’s inherent structure
might occur. As the Court has rightly noted, it cannot be enough simply to
enact some restriction and then have an owner take title with that restriction
in place. 22 Nonetheless, it is clear that, over time, a set of regulatory

16. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue
helps to shape the reasonableness of [an owner’s] expectations”); see also, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc.
v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002) (noting the relevance of existing regulatory constraints on the
reasonableness of owner expectations).
17. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
18. Id. at 1029.
19. The common-law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which translates as “so use
your own as not to injure others,” reflects the long-standing limitations in property law on uses of
property that cause harm. See Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in
American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1138 (1986).
20. See Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental
Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 421–24 (1998).
21. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30 (noting that “a legislative enactment can be deemed a
background principle of state law”).
22. This would be Justice Kennedy’s infamous Hobbsian stick in the Lockean bundle. See
id. at 627.
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constraints, even if challenged initially, can so deeply settle into the law of
property that no owner would be reasonable in challenging the restraints. 23
II. THE CRUCIBLE OF THE LAST CRISIS
With that brief doctrinal background, we can now turn to how takings
became a flashpoint in the recent economic crisis and how the courts have
addressed the litigation that followed.
A. Nationalization as a Regulatory Response to Economic Crisis
Nationalization played an important and prominent—if tailored—role
in responding to what has been called the “Great Recession.” This Part
examines the most significant examples of this practice, namely the
government takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the AIG. 24
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both have their origins in Congress’s
response to the Great Depression. In 1938, Congress established the
Federal National Mortgage Association, later known as Fannie Mae;
Congress privatized Fannie Mae in 1968, and established a companion
company, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac,
in 1970. 25 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase residential mortgages or
provide credit enhancement to facilitate the securitization of residential
mortgage-backed securities, in turn generating liquidity for home lenders. 26
At the height of the housing bubble of the early and mid-2000s, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed more than forty percent of all

23. Examples of once-contested limitations on property that now arguably “inhere in the
title” are not hard to find—they include zoning, constraints on air rights, and antidiscrimination
principles. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1660–61 (2008).
24. Another significant instance of nationalization in the last crisis was the bailout of General
Motors, but there were others as well. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1299–1300 (2011) (discussing
the fact that the federal government became the controlling shareholder in companies such as
GMAC and owned as much as thirty-four percent of outstanding Citigroup common stock); see
also Damian Paletta et al., IndyMac Reopens, Halts Foreclosures on Its Loans, WALL ST. J. (July
15, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121607890530252639 (describing the federal takeover
of IndyMac); Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks—Recipients
Include Citi, Bank of America, Goldman; Government Pressures All To Accept Money as Part of
ST.
J.
(Oct.
14,
2008),
Broadened
Rescue
Effort,
WALL
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122390023840728367 (discussing federal bank investments) .
25. See Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and
International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95–98 (2005).
26. Id. at 98. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were “government-sponsored,” which
is to say originally chartered by statute, they had long been private entities before the takeover.
Fannie Mae began trading on the New York Stock Exchange in 1968 and Freddie Mac began in
1984. Both companies suspended trading in 2010.
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U.S. residential mortgages, 27 a pivotal position facilitated by an implicit
Treasury Department guarantee of their obligations. 28 Therefore, any
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac failure would have sent ripples that could
have devastated the global economy.
As the economic crisis began to accelerate in the summer of 2008,
concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s viability were mounting. 29
In the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), 30 Congress
restructured the oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and expanded
the authority of its reconstituted regulator, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (“FHFA”), to place the companies in conservatorship. 31 On
September 7, 2008, less than two months after HERA’s passage, FHFA
placed both companies in conservatorship and replaced their top
leadership. 32 Common and preferred shareholders allege that, in the
process, they lost essentially all of the value of their stock. 33
AIG, a diversified financial services company that traced back nearly a
century to origins in East Asian insurance markets, 34 had assets of slightly
more than $1 trillion by the crest of the economic crisis in 2008. 35 Among
the more important of AIG’s many lines of business was the sale of credit

27. See David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1033 (2008).
28. See David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing
Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907, 909–10 (2010) (discussing
the market advantages that flowed from the then-implied federal guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s obligations).
29. Id. at 916–17.
30. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012). In addition to revamping Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
oversight, HERA authorized several mechanisms through which the Treasury Department could
provide the companies with capital as well as additional credit.
32. See Cynthia M. Hajost, From Oversight to Conservatorship: What Does the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Hold For GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, 18 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 3, 7–8 (2008) (discussing the statutory authority
invoked for the conservatorships).
33. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 431 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic _final_report_full.pdf. At the time of the takeover, Fannie Mae had
nearly 600 million preferred shares outstanding, with a redemption value of roughly $21 billion
and over a billion shares of common stock, valued at more than $7 billion. See Complaint at 14,
51, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 13-385C (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) [hereinafter Washington
Federal Complaint]. Similarly, Freddie Mac at the time had nearly 465 million shares of
preferred stock outstanding, with an alleged redemption value of about $14 billion, and about 650
million shares of common stock valued at roughly $3.3 billion. Id. at 14–15.
34. For a general history of AIG and a view from the person who shaped the company’s
growth in the run-up to the economic crisis, see MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A.
CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY (2013).
35. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 946 (2009).
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default swaps. 36 AIG sold these insurance contracts to investors who had
bought collateralized debt obligations, a type of asset-backed security often
based on pools of mortgages. This placed AIG, like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, firmly at the intersection between housing finance and global
capital markets.
Over the summer of 2008, as the housing-market collapse cascaded
through the secondary mortgage market, AIG faced severe liquidity
pressures related to its outstanding portfolio of credit default swaps and, by
mid-September 2008, the company could not procure private financing to
meet its continuing obligations. 37 Because the federal government feared
that AIG’s potential default would have had a significant global systemic
impact, the Federal Reserve agreed to provide AIG with a line of credit of
up to $85 billion. 38 In return, AIG granted the federal government preferred
stock convertible into a 79.9% stake in AIG, effectively putting the
government in charge of the company. 39

36. Credit default swaps guarantee to counterparties that “the party writing the CDS is
obligated to pay the counterparty the par value of the debt instrument in the event the instrument
defaults.” Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 55, recons. denied, 107 Fed. Cl. 374
(2012).
37. On September 15, 2008, the same day that the storied Wall Street mainstay Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, sending shockwaves through the market, Moody’s, S & P, and Fitch
downgraded AIG’s long-term credit rating, raising the distinct possibility of bankruptcy, given the
company’s collateral position at the time. See Washington Federal Complaint, supra note 33, at
56.
38. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed Cl. 428, 430–31 (2015). The Federal
Reserve invoked Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012), to validate its
actions.
39. The General Motors situation provides another example of nationalization as a regulatory
response. When the economic crisis began to crest in 2008, General Motors was the world’s
largest automaker, producing over nine million cars and trucks a year in thirty-four different
countries. See A Giant Falls: The Bankruptcy of General Motors, ECONOMIST (June 4, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/13782942. As the global economic slowdown progressed, gas
prices reached $4 per gallon in the summer of 2008 and auto sales slumped significantly. See
STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2010) (providing a general, albeit slightly biased,
history of the auto industry rescue from the former head of the Presidential Task Force on the
Auto Industry); see also Malcolm Gladwell, Overdrive: Who Really Rescued GM?, NEW YORKER
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/overdrive-2 (book review)
(noting some skepticism about Rattner’s account).
In December 2008, GM announced that it was running out of cash reserves and hinted that
bankruptcy was a genuine possibility. General Motors soon received a $50 billion bailout. Brent
J. Horton, The TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal, Historical, and Literary Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 217, 275 (2010). In the spring of 2009, President Obama’s newly formed Presidential
Task Force on the Auto Industry negotiated a much more substantial bailout of GM as an asset
sale under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code that left the federal government with a sixty
percent stake in the company. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and
Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009); Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM
ST.
J.
(June
2,
2009),
Collapses
into
Government’s
Arms,
WALL
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124385428627671889.
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B. Three Common Elements
These federal rescues share several similarities. One common element
is that each involved a company that might be considered “too big to fail,”
but whose failure was likely to have had broader economic or social
consequences. The concept is notoriously hard to cabin but reflects the
reality that actions of certain firms can raise particularly significant, indeed
even systemic, risks. Whatever the outer boundaries of the concept, it is
hard to argue that the entities nationalized during the Great Recession were
not deeply tied to broad macroeconomic networks that made their failure
potentially much more consequential than most other businesses.
Another common element is the infusion of public funds. 40 In the
policy discourse and the popular literature, these instances of
nationalization are generally described as “bailouts,” 41 but they each
involved shareholders and managers ceding control to the government and
concomitant significant reordering of the property rights of each company’s
economic stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, employees, retirees). 42
Each of the “bailed out” companies was failing at the time and each
instance of nationalization involved significant investment of federal
resources through a variety of mechanisms. 43
A final common element is that investors who perceived themselves as
harmed by the federal intervention have vigorously disputed the propriety
of the bailouts, leading to several high-profile takings suits to which we
now turn.

The GM nationalization has generated takings litigation, although the claims are being raised
not by shareholders, but rather by auto dealers. The dealers allege that the federal government
forced GM to terminate their dealerships in order to obtain funding, allegedly taking “franchise
contracts, ongoing automobile businesses, and automobile dealer rights under state law.” Colonial
Chevrolet Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 570, 571 (2012). The Court of Federal Claims has
allowed these claims to survive a motion to dismiss, but noted the unusual nature of a takings
claim predicated on the government’s role in assisting with a structured bankruptcy. Id. at 574–
75.
40. The line of credit to AIG eventually grew to over $182 billion. John J. Chung et al.,
Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2010: The AIG Bailout and AIG’s Prospects for
Repaying Government Loans, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 363, 365 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Adam Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011).
42. See Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (arguing that although “the federal government has
used nationalizations of corporations and federalizations of liabilities as policy tools to combat
crises,” the federal “government merely engages in semantic gamesmanship when it characterizes
this activity as a ‘bailout’”).
43. These public investments included, most prominently, direct subsidies, lines of credit and
other financing, assumptions of liability, debt guarantees, and similar loan backstops. See id. at
1358–65. See generally Levitin, supra note 41.
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C. Takings Challenges in Motion
Although the litigation by investors in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
AIG is still ongoing—a very important caveat—federal regulators have
prevailed so far. 44 Turning first to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a group of
individual and institutional shareholders filed a class-action suit in June
2013 in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the
conservatorships constituted either a taking of their property without just
compensation or an illegal exaction, or both. 45 The heart of the complaint,
which sought $41 billion in compensation, in addition to arguing that the
conservatorship was illegally imposed, 46 charged that the conservatorships
were designed to channel funds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to other
companies (providing the government with a vehicle to purchase troubled
mortgage debt), and ultimately back to the Treasury. 47 Specifically, the
shareholders asserted that they were harmed by FHFA’s order to the
companies to cease paying dividends other than to the Treasury, the
subsequent delisting of the companies’ common and preferred shares from
the New York Stock Exchange in June 2010, and agreements to sweep net
profits from these government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) to the
Treasury when they returned to economic stability. 48

44. Under any theory of takings liability, it is important to untangle questions of legal
authority to act from the question of whether an otherwise valid exercise of authority requires just
compensation. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suits, as well as the AIG litigation, assert
statutory arguments challenging the federal government’s basic authority to act in each instance.
One could conceivably frame this threshold claim in takings terms as a question of whether each
instance of nationalization meets the “public use” test, but that would mistake claims about the
breadth of statutory delegations of power with the doctrine that governs the range of legitimate
purposes available for eminent domain. The former tests the power to act, while the latter turns on
the constitutional validity of an otherwise authorized action.
45. See Washinton Federal Complaint, supra note 33, at 50. The complaint raises due
process and statutory claims. A number of similar cases have been filed raising similar claims.
See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action
Litigs., 70 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.D.C. 2014). Some of the cases that were part of this class action
include Fairholme Funds, Inc., v. FHFA (No. 13-1053); Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew, (No. 131025); Liao v. Lew, (No. 13-1094); Cacciapelle v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, (No. 13-1149);
Am. European Ins. Co. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, (No. 13-1169); Dennis v. FHFA, (No. 131208); Cane v. FHFA, (No. 13-1184).
46. The plaintiffs are arguing that the conservatorships were not, in fact, justified under the
criteria set forth in HERA, 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012), on the theory that the conservatorships were
intended to preserve the economy, not save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, per se. The plaintiffs
also asserted that Board consent under § 4617 was coerced.
47. See Washinton Federal Complaint, supra note 33, at 56.
48. See id. The federal government has raised a number of threshold jurisdictional, statute of
limitations, and standing arguments in seeking to dismiss the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
litigation. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11–21, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 13385C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Washington Federal Motion to Dismiss]. These
arguments, of course, may well eventually resolve the case short of a ruling on the merits of the
takings claims.
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In another class-action suit brought by the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigation, 49 investors sued the
Treasury and FHFA, claiming their stock in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
had become undervalued as a result of the two GSEs being placed under
conservatorship. After the GSEs were placed into conservatorship on
September 7, 2008, the Treasury entered into Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreements (“PSPAs”) with both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. 50
In exchange for funding, the Treasury received senior preferred stock in
each GSE. 51 The Treasury and GSEs amended the PSPAs several times,
often increasing the GSEs dividend obligation to the Treasury. The second
amendment to the PSPA raised the cap on how much the government could
lend to the GSEs; by August 8, 2012, the Treasury held $189.5 billion in
senior liquidation preference stock between both GSEs, which meant that
the GSEs’ annual dividend obligations to the Treasury were about $19
billion. 52
On August 17, 2012, however, the Treasury and the GSEs agreed to
the third amendment to the PSPA, which replaced the previous dividend
formula with one that essentially forced each GSE “to pay a quarterly
dividend to Treasury equal to the entire net worth of each Enterprise, minus
a small reserve that [shrunk] to zero over time.” 53 This is known as a “net
worth sweep.” 54 The plaintiffs challenged the third amendment to the
PSPA, alleging, among other things, 55 an unconstitutional taking. 56
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in a 2014 ruling, found
that the third amendment was not an unconstitutional taking of dividend
entitlement and liquidation rights without just compensation because the
plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable property interest protected under
the Fifth Amendment. 57 Moreover, even if there were a cognizable
49. 70 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.D.C. 2014).
50. Id. at 216.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 216–17.
53. Id. at 217–18.
54. Id. at 218.
55. The plaintiffs also raised a breach of contract claim, a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim, and a derivative claim of fiduciary duty under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and HERA. Id. The court held that HERA’s antiinjunction provision prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining any declaratory, injunctive, or other
equitable relief against FHFA or Treasury, id. at 219–20, and from bringing any of their derivative
claims against FHFA and Treasury, id. at 229. Included in these prohibitions were the APA
claims against FHFA and Treasury, the breach of fiduciary duty against FHFA, and parts of the
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with declaratory relief. Id. Finding
certain claims were not yet ripe, the court also denied plaintiffs monetary damages on the breach
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. Id. at 236.
56. Id. at 218.
57. Id. at 239.
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property interest, the plaintiffs had failed to plead a regulatory taking, as
they could not show that “the Third Amendment rendered their prospects of
receiving dividends any less discretionary than they were prior to the
amendment.” 58 Indeed, the court continued, there “can be no doubt that the
plaintiff shareholders understood the risks intrinsic to investments in
entities as closely regulated as the GSEs, and, as such, have not now been
deprived of any reasonable investment-backed expectations.” 59
Accordingly, they failed to state a claim against FHFA and the Treasury,
and the case was dismissed. 60
Moving to the AIG conflict, Starr International Company, Inc.
(“Starr”), one of the company’s largest shareholders (headed by Maurice
“Hank” Greenberg, the former chairman) filed suit on November 21,
2011. 61 Starr argued that the Treasury Department took advantage of AIG’s
vulnerability in September 2008 when it became AIG’s controlling lender
and shareholder. Starr asserted, through shareholder derivative and direct
claims, that the takeover constituted a “taking and illegal exaction of the
property and property rights of AIG without due process or just
compensation.” 62 Starr’s direct takings claims asserted that dilution of its
shares undermined their economic value as well as Starr’s voting power. 63
58. Id. at 244.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 239.
61. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 430–31 (2015). Starr filed complaints
against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims and against the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on the same day,
challenging actions taken by the Federal Reserve after the takeover as breaches of fiduciary duty.
See Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In early
November 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Federal
Reserve’s motion to dismiss. Id.
62. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013). In many instances, an
exaction theory would present distinct questions from a more general taking or inverse
condemnation claim, but in this case, the Court of Federal Claims noted that the test for Starr’s
illegal exaction claim “is identical to the Takings test.” Id. at 482 (quoting Casa de Cambio
Comdiv S.A., de C.V. v. United States, 291 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Starr also asserted
an equal protection claim. On July 2, 2012, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the due
process and equal protection claims except to the extent that the due process claims contemplate
monetary recovery. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 50 (2012). Starr’s asserted
shareholder derivative claims were barred under the business judgment rule. Starr, 111 Fed. Cl. at
471.
63. The Court of Federal Claims considered the relevant date to evaluate the market value of
the government’s 79.9% ownership to be September 22, 2008, at which point the shares were
apparently worth roughly $23 billion. Id. at 482.
The AIG litigation involves a separate claim of loss of shareholder voting rights (in addition
to the claim of loss of shareholder value), which, although potentially moot, now seems
implausible. The claim raises a corporate law variation on the denominator question familiar in
many other takings contexts. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross-Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (1988)
(identifying the idea of conceptual severance in takings jurisprudence). For all of the reasons the
Supreme Court has rejected conceptual severance in the context of physical property boundaries,
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In Starr v. United States, 64 the court addressed two main issues: first,
whether the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) had the legal
authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 65 (“FRA”) to
receive AIG equity in return for its loan to AIG and, second, whether an
actual taking under the Fifth Amendment occurred where the AIG Board of
Directors voted to accept the government’s proposed terms. 66
The court found that an illegal exaction did occur, although it
importantly noted that Starr had suffered no remediable injury. 67 Under the
FRA, the FRBNY could “serve as a lender of last resort” in “unusual and
exigent circumstances,” 68 but was not authorized to take as consideration
for the loan any part of the borrower’s equity. 69 Moreover, neither the FRA
nor any other federal statute allowed the government to take over a private
corporation as the FRBNY had 70—replacing the CEO and taking over
AIG’s business operations was a far cry from simply lending $85 billion to
AIG. 71 Nonetheless, the court found in Starr’s favor on the exaction claim,
meaning that Starr’s Fifth Amendment taking claim necessarily failed. 72
The court reasoned that if the government’s actions were unauthorized, no
Fifth Amendment violation could exist. 73
As for damages, the court aptly stated, “[i]f the Government had done
nothing, the shareholders would have been left with 100 percent of
nothing.” 74 Absent government intervention, AIG would have filed for
bankruptcy. 75 And in bankruptcy, the shareholders would likely have lost

see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (noting regulatory
takings analysis must focus on the “parcel as a whole”), and for property’s temporal dimension,
see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)
(noting an owner cannot sever a thirty-two-month segment from a fee estate as the relevant
denominator in evaluating a regulatory takings claim). It makes sense to reject disaggregating the
strands of rights inherent in shareholding. Corporate voting rights, as practically important as they
are, should not be removed as a stick in this particular property rights bundle. The market value
of the underlying shares, which would form the basis for any compensation, would presumably
reflect any control premium. Cf. Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications For
Control Premiums, Minority Discounts and Voting Share Differentials, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 487
(2012). See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
64. 121 Fed. Cl. 428.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
66. Starr, 121 Fed. Cl. at 431.
67. Id. at 434.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 435.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 436.
75. Id.
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the full value of their stock. 76 Ultimately, although Starr proved its
exaction claim, Starr could not show that it suffered any economic loss, and
thus could not recover any damages. 77
The proposition that resolved the Starr case—that failure to show
economic harm from a governmental action yields no compensation—is a
well-recognized aspect of regulatory takings jurisprudence. It certainly
informs one prong of the Penn Central regulatory takings test, which is the
“economic impact of the regulation on the claimant.”78 The fact that a
governmental action causes no economic harm does not immunize the
government from all potential takings claims, but factors heavily into the
threshold calculus. More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has made clear
that, even if a taking might have occurred as an abstract matter, a party is
not entitled to just compensation absent actual economic harm. 79 In short,
the theory on which the challenge to the AIG takeover was resolved
strongly suggests that federal intervention in the face of imminent
bankruptcy and a significant, or even entire, loss of investor equity
ultimately yields no compensable takings for those investors. 80
III. THE BASELINE OF OWNERSHIP AND THE FIRE NEXT TIME
What does that all mean going forward? As noted, these cases are
ongoing and nothing has been finally resolved. Nonetheless, the initial
shock that many commentators felt when the cases first began to emerge is
largely reflected in the early rounds of the resulting decisions. 81 If the cases
go the other way eventually, the question of nationalization will be even
more deeply contested than it is at the moment. But if the cases finally
resolve in roughly the direction of the decisions to date—judicial rejection
of challenges in the face of spirited, well-funded, and high-profile
opposition—this should send a signal to future shareholders who find

76. Id.
77. Id. The government filed a notice of appeal on August 12, 2015.
78. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
79. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (recognizing a property right and
that it had been taken, but finding that no compensation was due); see also Thomas E. Roberts,
Regulatory Takings in the Wake of Tahoe-Sierra and the IOLTA Decision, 35 URB. LAW. 759
(2003) (noting that after the Court decided Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982), the lower court on remand found no loss to the owner).
80. Moreover, a non-trivial argument can be made that, for shareholders, any loss from the
nationalization of one firm may be compensated implicitly in offsetting gains to the larger
economy. That is because shareholders, as a general matter, should not choose to bear firmspecific risk given how easy diversification is to achieve and the fact that no premium should be
paid for bearing overly concentrating investments. I thank Caroline Gentile for this observation.
81. See Steven Pearlstein, We Bailed You Out, and Now You Want What!?!, WASH. POST
(June 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/we-bailed-you-out-and-now-you-wantwhat/2015/06/05/95ba1be0-0a27-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html (a typical example that
reports on some of the outrage).
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themselves in a similar position. 82 There are many details that might
distinguish these cases, but in the aggregate, they have the potential to shift
a norm of ownership, with significant consequences for future crises.
A. Resetting the Baseline
Understanding how cases such as Perry and Starr might shift the
baseline of ownership in corporate entities that raise macroeconomic risks
returns us to the iterative nature of owner expectation and regulatory
takings. 83 The impact of regulation on such expectations depends on
context and is quite resource-specific as well: the norms that apply to land,
writ large, are different than the norms that apply to chattels and intellectual
property. 84 To be sure, this is a somewhat obvious point; nonetheless, the
nature of investor expectations about the extent of public intervention in the
kinds of companies that were nationalized during the economic crisis has
not been widely explored. The issue of the reasonableness of investor
expectations must be evaluated not as a general matter, but in light of the
relevant type of firm and the nature of economic ownership in large,
publicly traded companies—at least those that grow to a size that has
broader macroeconomic consequences. 85
In the ordinary course of business, most shareholders should be on
notice that regulation can change the economic landscape in which
companies operate, even for companies that are not as heavily regulated as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (or as banks and similar financial institutions
generally are). 86 If a company loses value—and shareholders suffer—
82. There are takings issues that implicate not just shareholders, but other economic
stakeholders in nationalization, as the auto dealer claims in the GM takeover illustrate. This
discussion, however, is focused solely on shareholders.
83. See supra Part I.
84. Moreover, within these broad categories, norms can vary significantly as well. What an
owner should reasonably expect of urban land may vary from what they should reasonably expect
of wilderness. Moreover, even after Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419
(2015)—the California raisin case—it is clear that the Court will tolerate significant restrictions on
the use of personal property and that personal property is also regularly seized and even destroyed
with relatively little constitutional concern in the name of law enforcement and national security.
See, e.g., Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding no
taking where a customs officer seized a laptop at an airport, damaging the hard drive and
destroying its data).
85. Questions under the Penn Central analysis regarding economic impact, as with the issue
of total deprivation, require factual development that remains contested in those suits that have
already been filed. Character of the government action, the final Penn Central factor, seems to
weigh heavily in favor of the government here, as these were bailouts to rescue deeply troubled
companies, but that too is a doctrinal intuition that is open to question.
86. Cf. Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and
Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 373–74 (1990) (discussing the role of expectation in heavily
regulated financial industries). The federal government raised a version of this argument in the
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suits. See Washington Federal Motion to Dismiss, supra note 48, at
30–31 (analogizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to banks subject to resolution authority).

2016]

RESETTING THE BASELINE OF OWNERSHIP

737

because some general regulation changes the playing field, it would be hard
to argue that the government action was a taking. And for most
shareholders, corporate bankruptcy is a baseline norm of ownership that is
beyond constitutional cavil. 87 Likewise, the resolution authority that the
government regularly wields to take over failing banks is very much
understood to be a part of the risk that any investor in such an institution
accepts. 88 Does the possibility of nationalization in the face of potential
bankruptcy or similar business failure fall into the same category?
Before the crisis, it might have been questionable whether the logic of
general regulatory change and bankruptcy extended to government
takeovers. 89 And that is where the current litigation may end up mattering
most. For the types of companies at issue—those that operate in a highly
regulated industry and, more importantly, have grown to a position of
systemic importance such that their potential failure poses a significant
macroeconomic threat—judicial testing and rejection of takings claims
would put future investors on notice that their ownership interests are
subject to nationalization. This precedent would not apply to all companies
in all circumstances, by any means. But for the kinds of companies likely
to require bailouts that involve federal control, the precedent would be
significant.

87. Cf. Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving
the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 449, 451 (2009).
Conceivably, a shareholder could make a judicial takings argument challenging the outcome of
such a process, but it would require rather Herculean assumptions about the limits of bankruptcy
court authority to sustain such a claim. Cf. James Stevens Rogers, The Impairment of Secured
Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment
and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 997–98 (1983) (arguing that the substantive
limits on bankruptcy authority to impact creditors’ rights derive from the bankruptcy power in
Article I, Section 8, not the Fifth Amendment). One could make the argument that any allocation
of resources in a nationalized failing company that does not parallel the result that would have
been reached through bankruptcy represents a compensable loss for those who did not realize that
supposed full value. But bankruptcy in general carries with it a great deal of indeterminacy,
making assertions of specific value hard to credit. Secured creditors could try to argue that their
specific collateral rights were impaired in the process, but again, that argument is hard to sustain
in light of traditional bankruptcy practice.
88. Under ordinary resolution authority, the government regularly takes control of financial
institutions. This authority is occasionally challenged on takings grounds, see, for example,
Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Am. Cont’l Corp. v. United
States, Fed. Banking L. Rep. P (CCH) ¶ 88,406 (U.S. Cl. Ct. Mar. 22, 1991), but it is fairly well
established that banks and those with ownership interests in those entities operate or invest against
the background of resolution authority and are not entitled to compensation when bank practices
require its exercise. Golden Pac. Bancorp, 15 F.3d at 1076.
89. It could be argued that the doctrinal principles at issue in Perry and Starr are settled law,
in which case the plaintiff investors in those cases could be understood to be trying to make new
law. This would mean that the resolution of these cases against them would merely reaffirm the
existing norms of ownership. While this is a reasonable argument, the specific types of claims in
the precise context of nationalization have been so rarely litigated, and remain so controversial,
that it would be hard to say that the baseline was clearly in favor of the state.
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We might even go one step further and ask whether such a judicial
response to the executive actions at issue could eventually “inhere in the
title.” This raises the question whether steps by regulators can themselves
legitimately be considered part of the equation of “background principles”
of property law. Clearly the heartland that the Supreme Court had in mind
in Lucas involved state-level common law jurisprudence, but, as noted, the
Court later clarified that legislation can likewise give rise to a background
principle (indeed, how could it not?). 90 Despite the fact that nationalization
involves action by federal administrators acting pursuant to delegated
authority, there is no logical reason why such action—especially once
tested judicially—could not likewise shape baseline norms. Certainly, the
Supreme Court has been clear that any governmental action can
theoretically trigger takings liability, regardless of the governmental actor. 91
For the same reason, executive actions should be able to contribute to how
we understand the baseline of ownership. 92
B. Justifying the New Landscape
Where, then, does that leave us? If the current trajectory holds, it will
play a material role in shaping the choice architecture facing public officials
in times of crisis, clarifying the latitude of public officials to nationalize
companies as a policy response. 93 And that confirmed latitude to act in the
narrow, but critical, circumstances of grave threats of macroeconomic harm
squares with fundamental fairness in the sense of legitimate equal burden
sharing at the heart of the Takings Clause that the Supreme Court
articulated in Armstrong v. United States. 94
To begin, one classic rationale for the compensation mandate is to
ensure that public actors internalize the cost of expropriating property,
whether the expropriation is done directly through eminent domain or

90. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001).
91. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S.
702, 713–14 (2010) (“The Takings Clause (unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto Clauses, see
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1) is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is
concerned simply with the act, and not with the governmental actor . . . .”).
92. The Supreme Court regularly notes that the Fifth Amendment merely recognizes property
that is already defined by state law, see, for example, id. at 707 (“state law defines property
interests”), but in the context of shares in corporations, the baseline of ownership is defined both
by state law, such as the laws of incorporation and shareholder rights, as well as federal law, such
as securities regulation.
93. There is always the threshold question of delegated authority, which has been at issue in
the recent litigation but is likely to be less so in future crises for two reasons. First, because of the
newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act resolution authority, see Merrill & Merrill, supra note 10, at 170–
71, but also because in the next crisis, Congress is likely to legislate for new bailouts and now has
a template of what worked and did not work during the last crisis in terms of necessary
authorization.
94. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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through regulatory actions that are the functional equivalent of a taking. 95
Compensation should, the argument goes, align incentives for the
government to regulate (or condemn) property efficiently.
Setting aside legitimate questions about whether this is how public
actors actually evaluate policy choices, about which a great deal has been
written, 96 crises—economic or otherwise—raise the issue of asymmetrical
risk. In a context of uncertainty and short decisional time frames, the
consequences of the failure to act are significant enough that a traditional
efficiency calculus might stand in the way of taking necessary steps.
There is a risk that, in the context of a fast-moving economic crisis, a
blanket mandate to compensate all those harmed economically by the state
assuming control of certain critical firms may be overly chilling at the very
moment when action is most necessary. As the dissenters to the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Committee put it, 97 perhaps somewhat ruefully:
For a policymaker, the calculus is simple: if you bail out AIG
and you’re wrong, you will have wasted taxpayer money and
provoked public outrage. If you don’t bail out AIG and you’re
wrong, the global financial system collapses. It should be easy to
see why policymakers favored action—there was a chance of
being wrong either way, and the costs of being wrong without
action were far greater than the costs of being wrong with
action. 98
Compounding that calculus with the additional—and potentially
prohibitive—cost of compensating all those whose economic interests are
harmed in such a bailout would make that decision much more difficult at a
moment when snap judgment is required.
Funding is ultimately possible—of the hundreds of billions of dollars
expended during the crisis, only a relatively modest portion was
95. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59
STAN. L. REV. 871, 881–84 (2007); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 620–23 (1984); Michael A. Heller &
James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998–
99, 1011 (1999).
96. See, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally
Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent
PA.
LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY
(2015),
Domain
Exercises,
U.
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2596&context=faculty_scholarship
(citing empirical evidence that calls into question the fiscal illusion hypothesis); Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 357 (2000) (“Government does not behave like a wealth-maximizer, and
therefore does not attach any intrinsic disutility to financial outflows—just as it attaches no
intrinsic utility to financial inflows. Rather, government internalizes only political incentives.”).
97. Congress established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2009 and the
Commission, after a more than a year of investigation, issued a comprehensive report on the crisis
in 2011.
98. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 433.
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accompanied by actual nationalization. But the unknown scope of potential
liability may overly deter decisions that have to be made under difficult
circumstances with imperfect information about the consequences. A
constitutional compensation mandate might transform “too big to fail” into
“too expensive to rescue.” 99
Which brings us, finally, to the question of whether it is ultimately fair
to ask shareholders and others with potentially compensable stakes in
companies that threaten the larger economy to bear the cost of responding
to the harm that the entity has created. As the Supreme Court has reiterated,
the Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” 100 This is a normative frame
that centers takings law on the legitimacy of the narrowness of burden
sharing for any given state action that harms property interests.
At its core, takings law thus invites a set of normative judgments about
the distribution of harms in the name of public good that admittedly must be
shaped by one’s priors, although the exercise is not entirely unanchored.
My own instinct is that compensation should not be mandated in the
relatively narrow contexts in which the federal government has tended to
deploy nationalization, given the significant financial and other economic
threats posed by the firms at issue and the dire consequences that could
follow from inaction. This is not some abstract collective punishment, but
rather a recognition that whatever formal limits there are to shareholder
liability as a matter of corporate law, questions of fairness can—and
should—take into account the potential for significant harm that might have
been caused by the failure of the firm those shareholders own. 101 This
99. One might raise a valid concern here about the slippery slope, namely whether we have
any reason to trust legislators and executive branch officials to weigh appropriately the nature of
the relevant emergency and the consequences of action or inaction. Eric A. Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have argued that crisis—literally the experience of fear by public officials—can sharpen
decisionmaking and that critiques of state action in the context of emergency grounded in
behavioral assumptions must take cognizance of the potential benefits of crisis management. See
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 626–34
(2003); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2008)
(discussing the challenges of framing the determination of emergency). I think the answer to the
slippery slope argument—and broader institutional concerns about comparative competence and
incentives—is better grounded in norms of democratic accountability than behavioral assumptions
in either direction about the capacity of decisionmakers. To the extent that political institutions
can respond to this decisionmaking, officials will have non-financial incentives to act with
restraint. And whatever pathologies one wants to associate with the federal government’s
response to the economic crisis, it was both widely followed and made the subject of subsequent
intense political focus.
100. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
101. Cf. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part
II—Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 55, 85–93 (1990) (arguing for a takings jurisprudence grounded in collective norms of desert
and punishment).
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might sound more like a nuisance rationale for nationalization than a
question of burden sharing, but it is really a way of framing the balance
between the individual and the community in the context—like a
firebreak—in which an individual’s insistence on compensation would
stand in the way of preventing great damage to the community.
This is not to say that non-constitutionally mandated compensation
should not be granted as a matter of discretion where individual property
interests have been harmed in the name of national exigencies, in times of
economic emergency no less than otherwise. 102 And one can imagine
creative mechanisms that would provide such compensation given that
nationalization can generate net benefits when companies are reprivatized—much akin to the way that the measure of just compensation
does not provide for the assembly value of a set of parcels. 103 But if the
question is who should bear the cost of responding to dire economic
emergencies involving firms that significantly threaten the larger economy,
from the perspective of distributive justice, I think the answer is that it is
legitimate for investors in such firms to bear that cost.
IV. CONCLUSION
Implicit in the question in regulatory takings jurisprudence of the
reasonableness of expectation and the related concept of restrictions that
“inhere” in title is that the balance between individual entitlement and
social obligation is dynamic and subject to evolution. What is reasonable
for investors in a world of significant market failures with serious
macroeconomic consequences must surely reflect regulatory responses that
are otherwise valid. Of course, that dynamism cannot be unbounded and
the federal government’s authority to intervene must reflect conditions that
justify that intervention. But when those conditions arise, a combination of
legislation, executive action, and high-profile judicial ratification in the face
of spirited opposition can “reset” the baseline of this particular kind of
ownership. Such a reset should confirm the range of policy latitude that

102. Many states, for example, choose to compensate those whose property interests are
damaged or destroyed in the name of emergency, even where such compensation is not
constitutionally mandated. See Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public
Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 135–37 (2013) (surveying state statutory compensation practices
in the context of responses to natural disaster).
103. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465,
1468 (2008). For example, the federal government returned a net profit of nearly $23 billion on
its ownership stake in AIG. Likewise, of the $116 billion that the federal government has invested
in Fannie Mae to date, Fannie Mae had already returned more than that amount to the Treasury as
of the first quarter of 2014, and is still continuing to pay. See Clea Benson, Fannie Mae Payments
BUS.
(Feb.
21,
2014),
to
U.S.
Will
Exceed
Bailout,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-21/fannie-mae-to-pay-u-s-7-2-bln-afterquarterly-profit.
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officials need in such crises, which is vitally important given how certain
they are to recur.

